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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
matter pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. Section 78-
2a-3(g) (1987) and Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On or about May 18, 1988 the Plaintiff filed a Complaint for 
declaratory judgment that temporary custody of the male minor 
child conceived and born to Defendant Bradley Thomas Belanger, a 
resident of the State of Nevada, and one "D.R.F." in the state of 
Nevada was properly in the Plaintiff, Utah Adoption Services for 
Women, and for an order granting that Plaintiff could place said 
child for adoption pursuant to said temporary custody. Defendant 
responded with a Counterclaim claiming that he had stated his 
opposition to the placement of said child for adoption, that he 
sought custody of said child and that he had been damaged by the 
Plaintiff's placement of said child for adoption. A trial of 
this matter was held in September and October, 1988 at which time 
the Court found that Defendant was the natural father of said 
minor child; that Defendant did not exercise his rights in the 
State of Nevada for establishment of paternity; that the signing 
of the consent by Defendant releasing said child to "D.R.F" for 
adoption was not without duress and coercion and that there was 
no evidence to support Defendant's- claims that the Plaintiff 
acted in bad faith. The Court found in favor of the Plaintiff 
and granted the relief sought by the Plaintiff, and concluded 
that the Defendant should have complied with Utah law in 
registering paternity; that Defendant had failed to establish 
paternity in Nevada pursuant to Nevada law; that the purported 
consent signed by Defendant was invalid; and that the Interstate 
Compact on Adoptions was not applicable to this proceeding. This 
is an appeal of the Memorandum Decision rendered by the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Leonard H. Russon presiding, entered on or about 
November 9, 1988. After trial the Court issued Findings of 
Fact. The Appellant considers the following findings central to 
the instant appeal: 
24. That night, the evening of April 27, 1988, Belanger 
(Appellant) in a telephone conversation with "D.R.F." learned 
that she had executed the Release and Consent and placed the 
child for adoption. Belanger said he was going to resist the 
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adoption. "D.R.F.: did not relay that information to Bagley 
(Respondent) until the next Saturday, April 30, 1988. 
26. Belanger was informed on Tuesday, May 3, 1988 by his 
lawyer that Nevada law required him to file an affidavit at the 
hospital to be on the birth certificate, and if not, to file an 
affidavit with the Nevada Department of Vital Statistics 
acknowledging paternity of the child. He filed an affidavit with 
the State more than a week after the birth and two months later 
he received a birth certificate with.his name on it. Belanger 
and D.R.F. had labored under the belief that Belanger's name was 
going to be on the birth certificate since his name was on the 
"worksheet." There is no evidence as to why the name was not 
placed on the birth certificate, except that the proper papers 
were not filed. 
29. Under the facts of this case, with the clear knowledge 
of Belanger that the child was to be born in Utah, to be placed 
for adoption with the Plaintiff in Utah, the defendant literally 
had months in which to so register with the Utah Bureau of Vital 
Statistics since such registration may occur prior to the birth 
of a child in Utah. And, during this time, plaintiff had legal 
counsel in other matters and could have and should have protected 
his rights because of the notice and knowledge that he had in 
this matter. Belanger did not exercise his rights in the state 
of Nevada for establishment of paternity as required by Nevada 
statutes. He and the natural mother were never married, they did 
not co-habit for at least six months prior to the period of 
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conception, nor continued to co-habit through the period of 
conception, before the child's birth he and the natural mother 
did not attempt to marry one another, he did not receive the 
child into his home and hold it out openly as his own natural 
child, and he did not timely acknowledged or admitted (sic) his 
paternity in a writing filed with the Nevada State Registrar of 
Vital Statistics as required. 
30. The Defendant eventually filed an affidavit in Nevada 
claiming paternity. By then, however,- the child had been placed 
by the natural mother, with the appropriate consent and release 
with the plaintiff adoption agency in Utah. 
32. (a) The mother, herself, brought the baby into Utah 
and placed it with the adoptive family and agency and signed her 
consent and release before a notary in Utah. 
(b) The mother had initially contacted the adoption 
agency in Utah while living in Utah with her sister concerning 
the adoption of the baby. 
(c) The mother's intention was to travel from 
California to Utah for the purpose of delivering her baby and 
placing it with an adoption agency, and the premature delivery 
was not anticipated. Only by accident was the baby born in 
Nevada. 
(d) Both the father and the mother knew of the 
mother's intention to give birth to the baby in Utah. 
(e) After the premature delivery in Nevada, both 
mother and father knew of her plans to personally deliver the 
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baby in Utah to adoptive parents and the adoption agency. 
33. The Court further finds that there were no actions upon 
the part of the plaintiff Utah Adoption Services for Women or its 
agents supporting the claims of the defendant in his 
counterclaim. The plaintiff acted in good faith in its attempt 
to assist the natural mother in placement of her child for 
adoption. D.R.F. approached the Plaintiff in Utah, and requested 
their services. The agency made the effort to travel to 
California to talk to D.R.F. and the father of the child, and 
left a consent form with him. While the adoption agency knew the 
father did not want the child to be placed for adoption, he never 
refused, nor did he indicate to the adoption agency that he would 
not consent (until after the child had been placed). While the 
consent has been determined not to be valid, because of all the 
facts known to the adoption agency, it was not unreasonable to 
dictate a consent, although inadequate, and to believe that 
Belanger would sign this consent with his understanding full 
knowledge that it had come from the adoption agency and was for 
the purpose of the child being released for adoption. There are 
no facts to support any claim of unethical or unprofessional 
conduct, or that the plaintiff agency acted wrongfully or 
maliciously. 
34. Belanger did not register with the Utah Department of 
Vital Statistics as provided under Utah Code Annotated 78-30-4, 
1953 as amended. 
Pursuant to these Findings of Fact the Court concluded, as a 
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matter of law, that: 
5, Utah law required the natural father making a claim of 
paternity to register with the Utah Registrar of the Department 
of Vital Statistics, and to indicate his willingness to support 
the child to the best of his ability, and failure to do so prior 
to the child being relinquished or placed with an agency for 
adoption terminated his rights. Belanger did not register with 
the Utah Department of Vital Statistics. Since he had full 
knowledge that the baby was going to be relinquished to the 
adoption agency in question in the State of Utah, and he knew 
when D.R.F. was flying to the State of Utah for this purpose, to 
protect his rights he was obligated to so register. His failure 
to do so terminated his rights within Utah. 
6. The Court finds that if it is a requirement in a Utah 
adoption to check for similar acknowledgment statutes in other 
states that the defendant failed to establish his paternity as 
required by Nevada law prior to the relinquishment of the child 
for adoption. 
8. The Interstate Compact on Adoptions is not applicable to 
this proceeding or the underlying adoption. 
14. The Nevada statute, NRS 126.041-041 state that a man 
"may establish his paternity where (1) he and the mother have 
been married during a certain period, or (2) the father and the 
natural mother were co-habiting for at least six months before 
the period of conception and continued to co-habit through the 
period of conception, or, (3) he receives the child into his own 
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home and openly holds it out as his natural child, or (4) he and 
the mother attempt to marry before the birth, or (5) at any time 
he acknowledges or admits paternity of the child in writing filed 
with the State Registrar of Vital Statistics." 
ISSUES PRESENTED BY APPELLANT 
1. Did the trial court err in finding that the 
Defendant/Appellant had not satisfied legal requirements to 
proclaim himself the natural father of the child, the Appellant 
having fully satisfied the requirements under his state of 
residence and the state of birth of the child, the State of 
Nevada? 
2. Did the trial court err in requiring the 
Defendant/Appellant to register with the Utah Department of Vital 
Statistics when Appellant was a resident of Nevada and the said 
child was conceived and born in Nevada? 
3. Did the trial court deprive the Appellant of due process 
rights by terminating his parental rights for failure to provide 
proper notice of paternity as required by Utah law. 
4. Did the trial court err in finding that the Interstate 
Compact on placement of children was not applicable to this 
matter and that Plaintiff/Respondent had not violated the said 
Compact? 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Brad Belanger has been a resident of the State of 
Nevada his entire life. (Tr. 2 of 3, p. 114) He and "D.R.F." 
lived together in Las Vegas, Nevada for a period of several 
months (Tr, 1 of 3, p. 145) and a result of this relationship, a 
child was conceived. "D.R.F." during her pregnancy visited with 
her sister in Salt Lake City, Utah for a few weeks, and, without 
the k n o w l e d g e of the A p p e l l a n t , c o n t a c t e d the 
Plaintiff/Respondent, Utah Adoption Services for Women, Ms. 
Bagley, director, to discuss a possible adoption of the baby she 
was carrying. (Tr. 1 of 3, pp. 145 - 148). "D.R.F." then 
returned to Las Vegas, Nevada to live with her mother and 
subsequently left to reside with a friend in Ontario, California 
after the Appellant refused to agree that placing the parties1 
expected child for adoption was an acceptable option. (Tr. 1 of 
3, p. 149). 
During this separation Appellant and "D.R.F." had numerous 
telephone contacts (Tr. 1 of 3, p. 151), and "D.R.F." requested 
Appellant to meet with her and Respondent in Ontario, California 
to provide family background information for an adoption, and at 
the time of the meeting Respondent left release documents for 
Appellant releasing the expected child for adoption, but 
Appellant informed Respondent that he would not sign a consent or 
release. (Tr. 1 of 3, pp. 155 and 158). 
On April 25, 1988 "D.R.F." gave birth to a male child in 
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Henderson, Nevada with the Appellant present in a supporting 
role. (Tr. 1 of 3, p. 162). Appellant checked the worksheet 
provided by the hospital for the filing of the child's birth 
certificate to ensure that his name was entered as natural 
father, since "D.R.F." was in constant contact with Respondent 
and appeared to be still considering an adoption. (Tr. 1 of 3, 
p. 165). Respondent advised "D.R.F." not to enter the 
Appellant's name on the birth certificate as that would "make the 
adoption easier" but Appellant and /'D.R.F." entered his name. 
(Tr. 1 of 3, p. 167). From the filing of this worksheet which 
contained the name of Appellant as natural father, all parties 
assumed that Appellant's name would appear on the birth 
certificate, and all parties acknowledged his paternity. (Tr. 1 
of 3, p 165 and p. 169). 
On April 26, 1988, the Appellant, "D.R.F.1, and the newborn 
child removed from the hospital to a nearby motel where the 
Appellant believed that he could convince "D.R.F." to abandon the 
idea of the adoption and go with him and the child to his 
parents' residence. (Tr. 2 of 3, pp. 126-172), (Tr. 1 of 3, p. 
168, pp. 173-174). During that evening and night the Appellant 
held the child and talked about keeping the child and raising him 
themselves. Also during that evening "D.R.F." telephoned 
Respondent and talked to her and Respondent dictated a consent 
form for Appellant to sign releasing the child to "D.R.F." for 
adoption, Respondent stating that now the natural father had been 
entered on the birth certificate, his consent would have to be 
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obtained. (Tr. 1 of 3, pp. 169-171). 
Respondent had purchased an airline ticket for "D.R.F." to 
fly to Utah for the birth of the child, but when said child was 
born in Nevada, "D.R.F." was to use the ticket to avoid the 
Interstate Compact for adoption regulations by having the mother 
bring the child to Utah thereby avoiding having the Respondent or 
adoption agency bring the child or cause him to be brought from 
another state for adoption placement. (Tr. 2 of 3, pp. 249-252). 
"D.R.F." was to fly to Utah on April 27, 1988. Appellant 
assumed that he would be the one to drive them to the airport and 
would have until that time to convince "D.R.F." to abandon the 
idea of adoption. However early the following morning, the 
mother of "D.R.F" and a family friend, a police officer, arrived 
at the motel, and Appellant began to realize that D.R.F. had 
decided to take the flight to Utah. "D.R.F." then produced the 
consent which had been dictated by Respondent and after being 
urged by "D.R.F." and her mother that he had promised to sign a 
release in exchange for being included on the child's birth 
certificate, the Appellant, in tears and protesting that he 
didn't want to do this, signed the consent. (Tr. 2 of 3, pp. 
127-127). 
Respondent realized that the consent form signed by 
Appellant was inadequate, as it was later ruled by the court 
invalid, and forwarded adoption documents to the Nevada Welfare 
Department for Appellant to sign. (Tr. 2 of 3, pp. 130, 262). 
Appellant was called to the office of one Marguerite Williams of 
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that department on Monday, May 2, 1988f and she advised himf 
after he stated that he objected to the placement of his child 
for adoption, to seek legal advice. (Tr. 2 of 3, p. 133). 
Appellant met the next day, May 3rd, with Robert E. Gaston, 
attorney, who immediately telephoned Respondent and notified her 
that Appellant was not going to sign the release forms, was 
seeking the return of the child to Nevada, and seeking custody of 
said child. (Tr. 2 of 3, p. 134). Respondent told Mr. Gaston 
that she had already placed the child for adoption and did not 
need a release form from the Appellant. Respondent then caused 
a Certificate of Search for Acknowledgment of Paternity to be 
issued in the State of Utah on May 11, 1988, in spite of her 
knowledge that Appellant was the father of said child, and that 
his name had been submitted for recording on the birth 
certificate in the State of Nevada. Interestingly Respondent 
made no such search for acknowledgment of paternity in the State 
of Nevada. 
On May 4, 1988, the day following the meeting with his 
attorney, Appellant, acting on the advice of his attorney that he 
must file an Affidavit of Paternity in the State of Nevada when 
the parents of a child are unwed, arrived in Fontana, California 
to ask "D.R.F." to sign the natural mother's portion of said 
Affidavit. "D.R.F." refused to sign, on the advice of the 
Respondent who again advised "D.R.F." that the adoption would be 
easier" if "D.R.F." did not sign, so the Appellant filed the 
Affidavit of Paternity with the State of Nevada without her 
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signature. Concurrently the Appellant filed an action in the 
State of Nevada, believing that, as the state of birth of the 
child, Nevada was the appropriate forum. 
Five days after she was served with the Appellant's Clark 
County action, the Respondent filed an action in the Salt Lake 
County District Court for declaratory judgment, creating a 
jurisdictional conflict. The Clark County, Nevada Court referee 
ruled that the Appellant was the natural father of said child, 
that he had a cause of action, and referred the matter to the 
State of Utah as the present state of domicile of the said child, 
leading to the action and decision appealed herein. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Point I 
The trial court erred in finding, in paragraph 29 of the 
Court's Findings of Fact that Appellant had not satisfied legal 
requirements to establish himself as the natural father of the 
child in the State of Nevada. In paragraph 14 of the Court's 
Conclusions of Law, the Court concluded: 
"The Nevada statute, NRS 126.041-041 state 
that a man "may establish his paternity where 
(1) he and the mother have been married during 
a certain period, or (2) the father and the 
natural mother were co-habiting for at least 
six (6) months before the period of conception 
and continued to co-habit through the period 
of conception, or, (3) he receives the child 
into his own home and openly holds it out as 
his natural child, or (4) he and the mother 
attempted to marry before the birth, or (5) at 
any time he acknowledges or admits his paternity 
of the child in a writing filed with the State 
Registrar of Vital Statistics." 
12 
The Appellant in fact did acknowledged his paternity in writing 
with the State of Nevada. The Appellant took every affirmative 
step and undertook each and every procedure as each became 
necessary and as he became aware of each requirement. He did 
insist on being entered on the worksheet at the hospital which he 
believed at the time would result in his name being on the birth 
certificate. He did file an Affidavit of Paternity with the 
State of Nevada. He did bring a legal action in Nevada which 
resulted in him being declared the father of said child. The 
length of the period between the birth of the child and the 
ultimate issuance of a birth certificate listing Appellant as 
father was the result of the actions of the mother and the 
adoption agency to avoid dealing with the Appellant in the 
adoption, and not the result of any indifference or unnecessary 
delay on the part of Appellant. 
The Court's Conclusion of Law, paragraph 5, that Appellant 
should have filed an acknowledgment of paternity in Utah demands 
an unreasonable standard of adherence to the law of another 
state from a party who was doing everything he knew how to do to 
acknowledge paternity in the state of birth of his child. 
Further it was unreasonable to expect Appellant to have taken 
action in Utah prior to the birth of the child when both he and 
"D.R.F" testified that the Utah adoption was always discussed 
between the parties as an "option" until such time as it actually 
took place. 
Utah case law which has established the unwed father's 
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responsibility to file acknowledgment of paternity and object to 
the adoption in a timely manner have the following common 
threads: 
1. Both parents were Utah residents, 
2. The father would not assume any financial 
responsibility for the mother or baby. 
3. The father did not sign a birth certificate or 
acknowledgments of paternity, 
4. Neither the child's mother nor the adoption agency 
were involved in an effort to prevent the father from asserting 
his parental rights, 
5. Neither the child's mother nor the adoption agency 
knew at the time of relinquishment that the father was seeking to 
assert his parental rights. 
The facts of the present case differ substantially from the 
above determining factors. 
Point II 
The trial court erred in finding that the Appellant had to 
register his claim to paternity in the State of Utah. The 
Appellant was a resident of the State of Nevada, the natural 
mother had been a resident of Nevada, the said child was 
conceived and born in Nevada, the Respondent knew the identity of 
the natural father and did not at any time advise him of the 
necessity of filing any acknowledgment of paternity, let alone of 
filing one in the State of Utah, and the Appellant believed that 
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he was doing everything necessary to establish his parental 
rights by filing his claim of paternity in the State of Nevada. 
It is reasonable and fairf given in the facts of this case, that 
the natural father, the Appellant, should be determined to have 
satisfied the requirements of the State of Utah by having 
satisfied the requirements of the State of Nevada. 
Point III 
The Appellant followed the procedures for the State of 
Nevada in claiming paternity of the child, obtained counsel to 
seek the return of the child, brought action in the State of 
Nevada to declare his paternity and to seek the return of the 
child to Nevada, sought and took alternative measures when the 
Respondent adoption agency, and the mother failed to cooperate 
with his attempts to file his claim to paternity, and at all 
times to all persons claimed his paternity and expressed his 
desire to raise and provide for the child. The adoption agency 
withheld specific information that it knew when Dr. Bagley used 
the jurisdiction of the State of Nevada, sought counsel on the 
Interstate Compact, and search for acknowledgment of paternity in 
the State of Utah, all of which adversely affected the 
Appellant's opportunity to fairly claim his child. The trial 
court deprived the Appellant of his right to due process when it 
terminated his parental rights for failing to file proper notice. 
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Point IV 
The Appellant claims that the purchase of the transportation 
ticket by Respondent adoption agency constitutes having 
"brought, or caused to bring" as provided under Article III, 
Conditions of Placement of the Interstate Compact on Placement of 
Children, Utah Code Annotated, 55-8b, 1953 as amended. The 
Respondent testified that she sought the advice of the 
authorities of the Interstate Compact before placing the child 
for adoption in Utah and claimed that she was not, according to 
the opinion of those authorities bound by the provisions of that 
Compact in the instant case. The finding that Respondent should 
or should not have complied with the Interstate Compact was 
important to Appellant because in the event Respondent was 
subject to said Compact, the State of Nevada would have been put 
on notice, and Appellant would have had more opportunity to 
assert his claim of paternity. 
However Respondent testified that she withheld information 
from those authorities which may or would have affected their 
opinion, specifically that she, Respondent, had paid for the 
ticket to transport the mother and child from California and 
subsequently, Nevada, and the crucial information that the child 
was born in Nevada. The trial Court erred in finding that the 
Interstate Compact on Placement of Children for adoption was not 
applicable in this case. 
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ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT 
HAD NOT SATISFIED LEGAL REQUIREMENTS TO PROCLAIM 
HIMSELF THE NATURAL FATHER OF THE CHILD, THE 
APPELLANT HAVING FULLY SATISFIED THE REQUIREMENTS 
UNDER HIS STATE OF RESIDENCE AND THE STATE OF BIRTH 
OF THE CHILD, THE STATE OF NEVADA. 
In support of its ruling that Appellant had not satisfied 
legal requirements to proclaim himself that natural father of the 
child the Court stated in page 12 of its Memorandum Decision 
entered in this matter that Appellant knew that "D.R.F." intended 
to give birth to her expected child in Utah and to place said 
child for adoption in Utah, and that further Appellant knew that 
"D.R.F." flew to Utah with the child with that intent. From 
that "knowledge" the Court concludes that Appellant should have 
reasonably been expected to protect his rights pertaining to said 
child by filing an acknowledgment of paternity in the State of 
Utah. (Conclusion of Law, #5) This does not seem to be a 
reasonable requirement for someone who is not conversant with the 
law. It would perhaps have been reasonable to assume that a 
layman, upon the birth of his child in the State of Utah, would 
conclude that he should file an acknowledgment of paternity in 
Utah, but when his child is born in Nevada and he is a resident 
of that state, he would reasonably be expected to pursue that 
acknowledgment in Nevada. 
It is an inaccurate finding that Appellant had known for 
months that "D.R.F." intended to place the baby for adoption in 
Utah since "D.R.F." herself in testimony supported the 
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Appellant's claim that he believed adoption was always only an 
option by stating that she was not, prior to the birth of the 
child, confirmed that she was placing the child for adoption and 
said "No, I was never totally going to do it until I did it. 
This is something I can't decide until I had the baby." (Tr. 1 
of 3, p. 163). The only testimony adduced at the time of trial 
with regard to "D.R.F's" intent to place the child for adoption 
came from Appellant and "D.R.F." who both testified that it was 
only discussed between the two as an option and that they 
experienced disagreement when Appellant refused to discuss 
adoption as an alternative. Testimony from Respondent indicates 
only that she knew that Appellant was unwilling and unresponsive, 
and noted in her progress notes that at the hospital he was 
suggesting arrangements for the remodelling of his parents' home 
to make a home for the child to be with its' parents. (Ex. P-8). 
No witness testified that it was a known and sure fact 
during the months preceding the birth of the child that "D.R.F" 
was certainly placing the child for adoption in Utah as concluded 
by the Court. The Court, in Findings of Fact 32(c), stated that 
"Only by accident was the child born in Nevada." Testimony and 
the notes of Respondent indicate that it had always been planned 
for "D.R.F." to stop in Las Vegas at that time for her birthday 
celebration. As always, "D.R.F."s" discussions with Appellant on 
that occasion supported Appellant's belief that "D.R.F." was 
still considering his arguments against an adoption. 
The Court ruled on Page 14 of the Memorandum Decision, with 
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regard to the State of Nevada, that the Appellant "never 
acknowledged or admitted his paternity in writing filed with the 
State Registrar of Vital Statistics as required." This is simply 
not the case. The Appellant's Affidavit of Paternity was filed 
May 4, 1988 in the State of Nevada (Tr. 2 of 3, p. 117). The 
Nevada statute, NRS 126.041-041, requires: 
". . . a man "may establish his paternity 
where (1) he and the mother have been married 
during a certain period, or (2) the father 
and the natural mother were co-habiting for 
at least six months before the period of 
conception and continued to co-habit through 
the period of conception, or, (3) he receives 
the child into his own home and openly holds 
it out as his natural child, or (4) he and 
the mother attempt to marry before the birth, 
or (5) at any time he acknowledges or admits 
paternity of the child in writing filed with 
the State Registrar of Vital Statistics." 
In trying to understand the Court's rational behind the 
ruling, one can infer one of two reasons: (1) that the Court is 
making a requirement of the Appellant that he should have taken 
such action before the birth of the child, since Appellant 
supposedly knew the mother intended to place the child for 
adoption immediately at its birth; or (2) that Court has 
determined that the Appellant should have filed his admission of 
paternity before Respondent's placement of the child with the 
adoption parents. 
In response to (1), the Appellant clung to his determination 
and belief that he could change the mother's mind, and (2) that 
his rights as a parent would be protected if he ensured, somehow, 
that he was included on the child's birth certificate. He 
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consequently took every action reasonably expected of a layman 
from the moment of the child's birth to ensure that he was on the 
birth certificate, including, but not limited to, telephoning 
the hospital the day of "D.R.F.'s" departure to Utah with the 
child to request the birth certificate; talking to Marguerite 
Williams of the Nevada Welfare Department and immediately 
following up on her suggestion, which had obviously not occurred 
to him previously, to consult with an attorney; talking by 
telephone with an attorney that same day and consulting with him 
the next day; leaving the same day and arriving the next in 
California to secure the mother's signature on an Affidavit of 
Paternity as advised by his counsel; taking the only avenue 
available upon "D.R.F.'s" refusal to sign said Affidavit by 
filing it that same day back in Nevada without her signature; and 
concurrently initiating a legal action in the county of birth of 
the minor child to halt the adoption proceedings and obtaining a 
ruling thereby of his paternity. In effect Appellant took 
every action which could reasonably be expected of him to satisfy 
Nevada's requirements to proclaim himself the father of the 
child. 
It is unfair and unjust to expect the Appellant to have 
achieved the desired end result of the proclaiming of his 
paternity in the short period of time, two days, between the 
child's birth in Nevada and his placement for adoption when such 
process was made unnecessarily lengthy by the intentional and 
deliberate actions of both the Respondent and " D.R.F. " to 
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frustrate Appellant's claim to paternity as follows: 
a) The Appellant was present at the birth of the 
child, and entered his name on the worksheet provided by the 
hospital for the filing of a birth certificate, in spite of 
Respondent's advice to "D.R.F." that "the adoption would proceed 
easier" if his name was not included. Both Appellant and 
"D.R.F." believed that the worksheet would lead to the 
Appellant's name being included on the birth certificate and all 
parties had expected it to be so. 
b) Both Appellant and "D.R.F." testified that "D.R.F." 
represented to Appellant that she could and would prevent the 
entering of Appellant's name on the birth certificate if he 
refused to sign his consent to release the child to "D.R.F." for 
adoption. Appellant did so. 
c) When Appellant rushed to California to obtain the 
signature of "D.R.F." on the Affidavit of Paternity, "D.R.F." 
telephoned the Respondent for advice and Respondent advised 
"D.R.F." not to sign such affidavit as "the adoption would 
proceed more easily if she didn't." The Appellant immediately 
returned to Nevada and filed his own affidavit acknowledging 
paternity of the child. 
d) Because of the refusal of "D.R.F." to sign the 
affidavit, the Appellant was required to wait a sixty (60) day 
waiting period for the mother to dispute said affidavit (Nevada 
statute 128.150) or rely on a court ruling of his paternity to 
bring about the issuance of the birth certificate bearing his 
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name as natural father. 
e) Respondent stated in testimony (Tr. 1 of 3, p. 131) 
in response to a question as to why she did not check in the 
State of Nevada prior to placement for adoption that "it wouldn't 
have done any good because it takes a week to ten days for the 
birth certificates to get there anyway." 
In light of the delays caused by the actions of the 
Respondent and "D.R.F." and the circumstances in this matter, the 
Defendant/Appellant had satisfied all requirements of his state 
of residence and the state of the birth of the child, the State 
of Nevada, to establish paternity and to have his name entered on 
the birth certificate as father of said child as expeditiously as 
possible. Any use of the adjective "untimely" is unreasonable in 
this case in light of the Appellant's actions, and not supported 
by the Nevada statute which states paternity may be acknowledged 
"at any time." 
Further, with regard to the Appellant's opportunity to take 
affirmative action prior to the birth of the child, such an 
expectation fails to take into account many normal factors, 
including the Appellant's genuine wish to convince "D.R.F.", not 
intimidate and threaten, and his polite and unassertive behavior 
with Respondent at their only meeting being the result of 
instructions from "D.R.F." to "be nice" and not from any lack of 
desire to strongly express his opposition to the adoption. It 
also fails to take into account the fact that it is very normal 
for a father to fail to realize his child as more than an idea 
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until the actual birth; until holding the child himself. The 
mother carries the child and is physically aware of the reality 
of another being, but this is not the case for a father. This 
father was galvanized into action after seeing and holding his 
son, and realizing the morning of the signing of the consent and 
the flight to Utah, that "D.R.F." was going to go ahead with an 
adoption and that he must take every action he could think of
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like calling the hospital for a copy of the birth certificate and 
going to the library to check the statutes to ensure that his 
consent would be necessary before the adoption could proceed. 
In the present case, there are no facts to support a claim 
that Appellant had any knowledge about registering a claim to 
paternity. In Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services, 670 F. Supp. 
1537 (D. Utah 1987) the father was advised of this necessity at 
the time of the birth of the child, and even had actual prior 
personal experience with the requirement. Respondent, who as an 
adoption agency had the superior knowledge in such matters, had 
not advised Appellant or the natural mother of this necessity and 
had even gone so far as to give advice and take steps that would 
made Appellant's performance' of the acknowledgment more difficult 
and time-consuming. 
What the Appellant did know and believe was that he must be 
indicated on the birth certificate of the child as the natural 
father in order to establish his parental rights. All the 
parties believed from the date of the birth of the child that the 
Appellant was on the birth certificate. The inclusion of his 
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name on the birth certificate had been Appellant's compelling 
intent, even to the point of "bargaining" with "D.R.F." to have 
his name included. The trial court erred in finding, in 
paragraph 29 of the Court's Findings of Fact that Appellant had 
not satisfied legal requirements to establish himself as the 
natural father of the child in the State of Nevada. 
Point II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING THE 
APPELLANT TO REGISTER WITH THE UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF VITAL STATISTICS WHEN 
APPELLANT WAS A RESIDENT OF NEVADA AND 
THE CHILD WAS BORN IN NEVADA. 
In its Findings of Fact, paragraph number 34, the Court 
found: 
"Belanger did not register with the 
Utah Department of Vital Statistics 
as provided under Ut. Code Ann. 
78-30-4 (1953, as amended)." 
And concluded, in paragraph 5 of the Conclusions of Law, that 
"Utah law required the natural father 
making a claim of paternity to register 
with the Utah Registrar of the Department 
of Vital Statistics, and to indicate his 
willingness to support the child to the 
best of his ability, and failure to do 
so prior to the child being relinquished 
or placed with an agency for adoption 
terminated his rights. Belanger did not 
register with the Utah Department of Vital 
Statistics. Since he had full knowledge 
that the baby was going to be relinquished 
to the adoption agency in question in the 
State of Utah, and he knew when D.R.F. was 
flying to the State of Utah for this purpose, 
to protect his rights he was obligated to so 
register. His failure to do so terminated his 
rights within Utah." 
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In this matter the Court has concluded that, although the 
child was born in Nevada and the Appellant was a resident of 
Nevada and the birth certificate was filed in Nevada, the child 
was placed for adoption in the State of Utah, and therefore the 
Appellant was required to register his acknowledgment of 
paternity with the Utah Department of Vital Statistics. If this 
conclusion is reasonable it means that: 
(1) all the actions of the mother and the adoption 
agency in this matter in bringin-g the child to Utah and 
relinquishing it for adoption in one day and in attempting to 
avoid dealing with the Appellant as regards the adoption were 
justified; 
(2) the birthplace and state of issuance of birth 
certificate of a child placed for adoption has no meaning or 
importance under the law in Utah, as only Utah's records will be 
checked or judged valid in determining an unwed father's claim to 
paternity; 
(3) an adoption agency can deliberately or 
unintentionally fail to advise an unwed father of the requirement 
to claim paternity in the State of Utah in discussions held with 
said unwed father, knowing that said adoption agency can then 
avoid dealing with the wishes and rights of that father on the 
technicality of simply initiating a paternity search in the State 
of Utah; 
(4) an adoption agency in Utah may, as in this case, 
act as if the father of a child is unknown, simply because he is 
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actively involved in protecting his paternal rights in another 
state, and has not claimed them in the State of Utah, when it in 
fact does know the identity of said father and his attitude 
towards the adoption. 
The primary purpose of the filing of acknowledgment of 
paternity is the issuance of a birth certificate naming a natural 
mother and father as in the case of a legitimate child. If the 
State of Utah has no interest in issuing a birth certificate for 
said child , why require the Appellant to file a duplicate 
acknowledgment in the State of Utah? 
The facts of this case represent a conflict of law between 
the states of Utah and Nevada. "Is an adoption agency in Utah 
required to recognize the rights and claims of a natural father 
made in the State of Nevada regarding his child born in Nevada?" 
In Buhler v. Maddison, 109 Utah 267, 176 P.2d 118 (1947), 
the Supreme Court of Utah ruled regarding potential loss of 
rights in applying procedural and substantive law when a cause of 
action or right arises in a sister state. The Court stated: 
"When the situation is one where a 
different result might be reached 
according to the rule applied, the 
court must determine under the law 
of conflicts of laws whether it will 
apply the rule of a foreign state 
for rules of substance and the 
forum state for procedural process. 
In determining whether an element or 
a cause of action is a matter of 
substance or of procedure, the court 
will examine the statute or rule of 
law creating the claimed right or 
duty, and the interpretation thereof 
by the courts of state creating the 
right, or where the cause of action arose." 
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Id at 122, emphasis added. 
In this present case the Appellant's paternal right "arose" 
in the State of Nevada where the birth of the child took place 
and the Appellant complied with Nevada law in filing an affidavit 
of acknowledgment of paternity and having himself named as the 
father on the issued birth certificate. There would be a 
"different result" to the ruling in this case that Appellant be 
required to file under Utah law and that Appellant's paternal 
rights be terminated if the rule of the State of Nevada were 
applied. According to Nevada statute a "presumed father's" 
parental rights cannot be terminated without hearing, (NRS 
128.150) and the acknowledgment of paternity may be submitted "at 
any time" (NRS 126.051(2)(e)). 
Appellant contends that it is not reasonable nor should this 
state compel a citizen of a sister state to file an 
acknowledgment of paternity in two states particularly in light 
of the fact that this child was conceived in Nevada, born in 
Nevada, the putative father resided in Nevada, the birth 
certificate (a form of acknowledgment of paternity) was issued in 
Nevada, the Respondent and mother knew of the existence of the 
natural father and his residence in Nevada, and the Respondent 
attempted to utilize a Nevada State agency to procure the consent 
of the Appellant in this matter. Further, the Respondent was in 
serious violation under the Nevada statutes, Sections NRS 127.053 
and NRS 127-057, regarding notice of adoption, which impose a 
misdemeanor penalty, so that if the laws of the State of Nevada 
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are invoked, a completely different result would occur. 
Appellant filed suit in Nevada to regain custody of his 
child and Respondent filed suit in Utah five (5) days after she 
was served in Nevada with the summons, thus creating the conflict 
of jurisdictions. In referring the matter to the Utah court, the 
Nevada referee deferred to the present domicile of the child in 
question, not to the superior claim of Utah statute over the 
actions of the parties. Appellant contends that the trial court 
should have looked to the laws of the State of Nevada in 
determining whether Appellant had satisfied requirements to 
establish his paternity and whether Appellant's parental rights 
should be terminated, and erred in finding that the Appellant 
had failed to satisfy the requirements for acknowledgment of 
paternity in Nevada, and the erred in requiring the Appellant to 
register with the State of Utah Department of Vital Statistics. 
Point III 
THE TRIAL COURT DEPRIVED THE APPELLANT 
OF DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY TERMINATING 
APPELLANT'S PARENTAL RIGHTS FOR FAILURE 
TO PROVIDE NOTICE OF CLAIM OF PATERNITY. 
The most prevalent and necessarily the most important issue 
in recent Utah cases involving the paternal rights of an unwed 
father is that of due process. The rights of a putative father 
have been well-established in these and other cases. The facts 
of this case contain many of the same factual elements of the 
recent cases, but also some which are significantly different. 
Deprivation of parental rights must be supported by clear 
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and convincing evidence. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 
31 L.Ed.2d 551, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972), the United States Supreme 
Court firmly held that an unwed father does have a 
constitutionally protected interest in his children. At issue in 
that case was a state law which, in effect, provided that 
children of unwed fathers become wards of the state upon the 
death of the natural mother. The court first ruled that the 
interest of a father in his children is sufficiently important to 
be constitutionally protected, holding-: 
The private interest here, that of a man 
in the children he has sired and raised, 
undeniably warrants deference and, absent 
a powerful countervailing interest, 
protection. It is plain that the interest 
of a parent in the companionship, care, 
custody, and management of his or her 
children "come(s) to this Court with a 
momentum for respect lacking when appeal 
is made to liberties which derive merely 
from shifting economic arrangements." 
The rights to conceive and raise one's 
children have been deemed "essential" . . . 
and "(r)ights far more precious . . . than 
property rights". 405 U.S. at 651, 31 
L.Ed.2d at 558. (citations omitted, 
emphasis added) 
The United States Supreme Court also made clear that a man's 
interest in his children was no less constitutionally protected 
merely because he had not been formally married to their mother: 
(T)he law (has not) refused to recognize 
those family relationship unlegitimized by 
a marriage ceremony. The Court has declared 
unconstitutional the state statute denying 
natural, but illegitimate, children a 
wrongful-death action for the death of their 
mother, emphasizing that such children cannot 
be denied the right of other children because 
familial bonds in such cases were often as 
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warm, enduring and important as those arising 
within a more formally organized family unit . . . 
"To say that the test of equal protection 
should be that of 'legal1 rather than 
biological relationship is to avoid the 
issue . . . " 405 U.S. at 651-52, 31 L.Ed. 
2d at 559 (citations omitted) 
The court then unequivocally stated its holding that: 
Stanley's interest in retaining custody of 
his children is cognizable and substantial. 
Because of the drastic nature of depriving a father of the 
constitutionally protected right to his child and his parental 
rights, the burden of proof must be met with evidence that is 
clear and convincing. The court has made that position clear in 
the case of Robertson v. Hutchison, 560 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977) 
where it stated: 
Arising out of the natural bonds of 
affection and concern which natural 
parents usually have for their 
children, it is and should be the 
policy of the law to support and give 
strength to the family by encouraging 
the preservation of the parent-child 
relationship and by being reluctant 
to interfere with or destroy it. 
Accordingly, the Court does not easily 
find such abandonment, but will do so 
only when the evidence is clear and 
convincing that the parent has either 
expressed an intention or so conducted 
himself as to clearly indicate an 
intention, to relinquish parental 
rights and reject parental responsibilities. 
This need for "clear and convincing evidence" of the 
abandonment of a child before a parent's rights are relinquished 
requires a careful examination of all the factual elements in 
this case to determine if Appellant "expressed an intention or so 
conducted himself as to clearly indicate an intention" to 
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relinquish or abandon his parental rights to his son. The Court 
found, in its Findings of Fact, paragraph number 34: 
"Belanger did not register with the 
Utah Department of Vital Statistics 
as provided under Ut. Code Ann. 
78-30-4 (1953, as amended)." 
And, the Court concluded, in paragraph 5 of the Conclusions of 
Law, that 
"Utah law required the natural father 
making a claim of paternity to register 
with the Utah Registrar of the Department 
of Vital Statistics-, and to indicate his 
willingness to support the child to the 
best of his ability, and failure to do 
so prior to the child being relinquished 
or placed with an agency for adoption 
terminated his rights. Belanger did not 
register with the Utah Department of Vital 
Statistics. Since he had full knowledge 
that the baby was going to be relinquished 
to the adoption agency in question in the 
State of Utah, and he knew when D.R.F. was 
flying to the State of Utah for this purpose, 
to protect his rights he was obligated to so 
register. His failure to do so terminated his 
rights within Utah." 
In re. Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686, 689 (Utah 86) 
and Ellis vs. Social Services Dept., Etc., 650 P.2d 1250 (Ut. 
1980) this Court was previously asked to determine the 
constitutionality of Utah Code Annotated 78-30-4(3). In these 
cases the Court avoided overturning the statute itself by stating 
that the application of the statute could be looked at, and that: 
If the putative father "is successful 
in showing that the termination of his 
parental rights was contrary to basic 
notions of due process, and that he 
came forward within a reasonable time 
after the baby's birth, he should be 
deemed to have complied with the 
31 
statute," 
In Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah, 681 P.2d 208 
(Utah 1984) the Court defined "within a reasonable time" or the 
reasonable opportunity standard as one that applies only where it 
is first shown that it was "impossible" for the father to file 
"through no fault of his own," 
The "impossibility" exception is applicable in Swayne v. 
L,D.S. Social Services, 670 F. Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 1987), Wells, 
and Sanchez v, L,D.S, Social Services, 680 P.2d 753 (Utah 1984) 
because of the following: 
1. Both parents were Utah residents. 
2. The father would not assume financial responsibility for 
the mother and baby, 
3. The father did not sign a birth certificate or 
acknowledgment of paternity. 
4. Neither the child's mother nor the adoption agency were 
involved in an effort to prevent the father from asserting his 
parental rights, 
5. Neither the child's mother nor the adoption agency knew 
at the time of relinquishment that the father was seeking to 
assert his parental rights, 
A brief review of the facts of this case highlight 
significant variations with these factors: 
1. The father was a resident of Nevada; the mother was a 
resident of Nevada at the time of conception of the child and a 
resident of the California immediately prior to the birth; the 
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child was born in Nevada and transported to Utah after its birth. 
2. The father had plead and bargained with the mother to 
stay with the father and raise the child as a family unit. 
3. The father made every effort to be entered on the birth 
certificate, and filed an affidavit of paternity. 
4. Both the child's mother and the adoption agency were 
involved in actions and omissions which interfered with the 
father speedily asserting his parental rights, including, but not 
limited to, paying for the transportation of the mother and child 
to Utah in an effort to avoid provisions of the Interstate 
Compact on Adoptions which would have put the State of Nevada and 
the father on notice prior to the effecting of the adoption; 
advising the mother not to enter the father's name on the birth 
certificate; checking for acknowledgment of paternity in the 
State of Utah and not Nevada; the mother's failure to inform the 
agency prior to the relinquishment of the child that the father 
intended to dispute the adoption; the mother's misleading of the 
father until less than one hour prior to the mother and child's 
flight to Utah that she and the child would stay with him in 
Nevada; the agency's failure to inform the Nevada Welfare 
Department that the child was born in Nevada; agency's failure to 
report to Utah authorities that she knew the identity of the 
natural father; agency's advice and mother's refusal to sign the 
acknowledgment of paternity. 
The "impossibility" exception is inapplicable, however, in 
situations where both parents lived out of Utah and the child is 
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born out of Utah. In In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, and Ellis, 
the Court found that even though the child was relinquished prior 
to filing the notice of paternity, the bar imposed by the statute 
should not apply because: 
In the usual case, the putative father 
would either know or reasonably should 
know approximately when or where his 
child was born. Ellis, p. 1256. 
Appellant sought to protect his parental rights "when and 
where" the child was born, in the State of Nevada. Utah Code 
Annotated Section 78-30-4(3) in summary says that an unwed father 
loses parental rights to his child if he fails to provide timely 
nbtice; in this case, the Appellant's notice of claim of 
paternity was timely filed. The Respondent filed her search for 
acknowledgment of paternity on May 11, 1988 in the State of Utah. 
If she had filed the same search in the State of Nevada she would 
have found the Appellant's Affidavit of Acknowledgment of 
Paternity on file. 
Appellant has been deprived of due process in the 
terminating of his parental rights for failure to comply with 
Utah Code Annotated 78-30-4, as was stated by the Court in In Re. 
Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 
In all but the most exceptional cases, 
the operation of section 78-30-4 achieves 
that balance as it affords putative fathers 
the opportunity to assert and protect their 
rights while provided a finite point at which 
the state's interest supercedes that of the 
father. However, where a father does not know 
of the need to protect his rights, there is 
no "reasonable opportunity" to assert or 
protect parental rights. In such a case, the 
operation of the statute fails to achieve 
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the desired balance and raises serious 
due process concerns. 1x3, page 691. 
In Ellis, the Court stated that "a statute fair upon its 
face may be shown to be void and unenforceable as applied", and 
in Wells stated "The general test for the validity of such rules, 
the test of procedural due process, is fairness." The 
termination of Appellant's parental rights in the circumstances 
of this case by either the ruling that he should have complied 
with Utah Code Annotated 78-30-4 or that he did not file an 
affidavit of paternity in the State of Nevada is not fair or 
justifiable. In the State of Nevada, Appellant would have been 
accorded the right of a hearing before termination of his 
parental rights. 
Point IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED FINDING THAT THE 
INTERSTATE COMPACT ON PLACEMENT OF 
CHILDREN IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE. 
The Appellant claims that the purchase of the transportation 
ticket by Respondent adoption agency for the use of the mother 
and baby constitutes having "brought, or caused to bring a child 
into the receiving state for the purpose of placement for 
adoption" as provided under Article III, Conditions of Placement 
of the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children, Utah Code 
Annotated, 55-8b, 1953 as amended. 
The Respondent testified that she sought the advice of the 
authorities of the Interstate Compact before placing the child 
for adoption in Utah and claimed that she was not, according to 
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the opinion of those authorities, bound by the provisions of that 
Compact in the instant case. (Tr. 2 of 3, pp. 251-252) The 
finding that Respondent should or should not have complied with 
the Interstate Compact was important to Appellant because in the 
event Respondent was subject to said Compact, the State of Nevada 
would have been put on notice, the Respondent and the mother 
would not have been able to avoid dealing with the Appellant in 
the adoption, and Appellant would have had more opportunity to 
assert his claim of paternity prior to the placement of the child 
for adoption. 
However Respondent testified that she withheld information 
from those authorities when seeking their opinion. It is the 
belief of the Appellant that said information may or would have 
affected their opinion, specifically that she, Respondent, had 
paid for the ticket to transport the mother and child from 
California and subsequently, Nevada, and the crucial information 
that the child was born in Nevada. 
This is yet another example of the Respondent adoption 
agency exercising a selective process in the facts which were 
revealed to others in this adoption. She asked Dr. Bill Ward, 
Deputy Interstate Compact Administrator for the State of Utah if 
she was bound by the Interstate Compact if the birth mother 
brought the child to Utah, yet she omitted to tell Dr. Ward that 
she, Respondent, had paid for the ticket. She filed a search for 
acknowledgment of paternity in Utah, knowing that said 
acknowledgment was being pursued by Appellant in Nevada. She 
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failed to file a search for paternity in Nevada although she knew 
the child had been born there. She "used" the authority and 
jurisdiction of the State of Nevada by sending authorization and 
release documents to the Nevada Welfare Department for the 
signature of Appellant, and yet failed to tell said authorities 
that the child was born in Nevada and used the expression 
"putative father" for Appellant when she knew that both mother 
and Appellant acknowledged Appellant's paternity. 
Adoption agencies must be required to conduct their business 
with the most scrupulous honesty, care, and attention to detail 
because of the delicate and far-reaching effects of their 
actions. It is unfair that should one adoption agency be 
advising a putative father of his rights to claim paternity while 
another takes every "legal" avenue to discourage a father from 
doing so, and, further, from dealing with the father at all. A 
court must abide by strict procedures for ascertaining the 
attitude and intent of a natural father before terminating his 
rights in the State of Utah. An adoption agency should be just 
as sure of protecting those rights. There are certainly enough 
instances of unwed fathers having no concern whatsoever for the 
future or welfare of their illegitimate offspring. It is 
unthinkable that an unwed father who is honestly taking action 
and seeking to be involved in the decisions that affect his child 
should be outflanked by a superior knowledge of laws in another 
state. The trial Court erred in finding that the Interstate 
Compact on Placement of Children for adoption was not applicable 
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i n t h i s c a s e . 
CONCLUSION 
B a s e d u p o n t h e f o r e g o i n g P o i n t s a n d A u t h o r i t i e s , 
D e f e n d a n t / A p p e l l a n t h e r e i n r e q u e s t s t h a t t h i s C o u r t : 
1 . R e v e r s e t h e t r i a l c o u r t and f i n d t h a t t h e 
Defendant/Appellant had sa t i s f i ed the legal requirements of the 
State of Nevada to es tab l i sh pa te rn i ty and thereby sa t i s f i ed any 
and a l l legal requirements to proclaim" himself the natural father 
of h i s chi ld; 
2 . R e v e r s e t h e t r i a l c o u r t and f i n d t h a t t h e 
Defendant /Appel lant i s not requ i red to r e g i s t e r a claim of 
p a t e r n i t y with the Utah Department of Vital S t a t i s t i c s when he 
had done so in the State of Nevada; 
3 . R e v e r s e t h e t r i a l c o u r t and f i n d t h a t t h e 
Defendant/Appellant was deprived of due process by the C o u r t ' s 
r u l i n g to terminate h is parental r igh t s for f a i lu re to provide 
notice of claim of pa t e rn i t y ; 
4 . Reverse the t r i a l court and find tha t the I n t e r s t a t e 
Compact for Placement on Children was applicable in t h i s matter 
and t h a t Respondent was required to act in compliance thereof; 
and 
5 . Order t h a t , t h e r e f o r e , the case be remanded, with 
judgment to be rendered for the Defendant/Appellant. 
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